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ABSTRACT
Using Virtual Reality for Requirements Validation
by Dejan Desovski
Failures of high consequence systems are intolerable. Studies have shown that a
significant percentage of safety problems can be traced back to errors in the specification.
An important problem that arises during validation is how to include a domain expert in
this process.  Although the domain experts have exclusive knowledge about the system
operation, they may not understand formalisms used for system specification.
Essential type of “evidence” of the correctness of the formalization process must
be provided by human-based calculation.  Human calculation can be significantly
amplified by shifting from symbolic representation to graphical representations. This, in
turn, provides an environment for validation of the system model.
We have developed a virtual environment model for the Production Cell robotic
system, which runs in an ImmersaDesk Virtual Reality environment. Although it
introduces higher cost in the requirements formalization phase, this approach can be very
beneficial in the development of high consequence systems.
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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Technology advances make it possible to realize increasingly sophisticated
behaviors and control functions by digital implementations.  Because of this capability,
digital systems being developed are responsible for carrying out "critical" operations.  We
define an operation or behavior to be "critical" if the failure to carry it out correctly leads
to an unacceptable loss, such as the loss of human life or a significant monetary loss.  For
example, production facilities can be automated using robots, producing more uniform
and accurate products, and requiring fewer workers, but an incorrect robotic
manufacturing system can result in the destruction of costly equipment (i.e., the robots)
as well as an extended shutdown of the manufacturing plant.  Any system that has one or
more “critical” operations can be defined as High Consequence System. Because of the
high cost associated with their failure, one must provide strong evidence that the design
of a high consequence system is fault-free, or if that is out of the reach, to provide strong
evidence that it is unlikely for the design to contain a fault.
Ideally, the development of High Consequence Systems begins with the
formalization phase. In this phase, an informal problem description is mapped into a
formal framework and it is completed when a formal specification has been obtained. The
formalization phase is followed by the implementation phase, in which a formal
specification is used to produce an executable implementation. Since both the
specification and the implementation are formal objects (they have precise and well-
defined semantics), it is possible, in principle, to formally verify the correctness of the
implementation with respect to the specification by using mathematical proof techniques.
However, we can never be sure that the formalization phase has been done correctly in
the first place. This uncertainty arises from the fact that the formalization process is
mapping informal knowledge into a formal framework. Thus, formalization, by its very
nature, lies beyond the reach of verification.
Providing evidence concerning the correctness of specifications and the models
they are comprised of is very important because studies have shown that a significant
percentage of safety problems can be traced back to errors in the specification [3].
2To date, most validation techniques are highly biased towards calculations
involving symbolic representations of problems. These calculations are either formal (in
the case of consistency and completeness checks), or informal in the case of code
inspections. We believe that an essential type of “evidence” of the correctness of the
formalization process must be provided by human-based calculation, because humans
formulate and understand the original problem. We further believe that human calculation
can be significantly amplified by shifting from symbolic representation to graphical
representations.
If it is possible to construct a formally defined visual representation of the system
model, then the formulas which represent the functional capabilities and safety
constraints can be coupled and graphically displayed.  Using this representation, the
correctness of the system model can be validated by human inspection, much in the same
way that the mathematically structured formulas are validated by human inspection.  Our
belief is that human intuition and understanding will be much more effective with respect
to a three dimensional visual representation, than it would be in a mathematical domain.
Consequently, visual representation of the formal (symbolic) description of
systems is the main goal of our research. Furthermore, we want to demonstrate the
advantages of visual representation for the validation of requirements models in virtual
reality environments.
We restrict our interest to the set of stable reactive systems [12]. They have the
following properties: state transitions can be initiated only by the controller, transitions
between the states are deterministic and the system can be halted in any state without the
need for continuous monitoring and control.  In this work, we use a robotic system called
the production cell as a simple yet meaningful example for development and evaluation
of suitability of visual models for software requirements analysis.  The prototype
implementation allowed us to visualize functional capabilities of the production cell, to
inspect the correctness of the developed formal model, and to display and analyze the
effects of several safety constraints.
3CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
2.1. Relational Specifications
Most of the previous work on requirements validation is concerned with formal
constructs that are easy to understand by humans, possibly in an incremental fashion.
Relational Specification is one of the specification methods that have well defined theory
and constructs. As its name suggests, this method is based on relations defined on
specified sets. We will assume that the reader is familiar with the properties of relations
and we will give short description of this method, taken from [10][13].
Definition 1: A specification on space S is a relation on S.
A specification R on S contains all the input output pairs that the specifier
considers being correct.
Definition 2: A relation R is said to refine relation R’ (R  R’) if and only if:
''and' RLRRLRLR ÍÇÍ ooo
Here the operation ( ) ( ) ( ){ }BbcAcaScbaABBA ÎÙÎÎ$== ,,:,o  is with
highest precedence, and L is the total relation SS´ .
This definition basically states that R  R’ if and only if:
1) )'()( RdomRdom Ê
2) ( ) ( ) ',)'(, RbaRdomaRba Î®ÎÙÎ
A program P on space S computes a function on S, which is called the functional
abstraction of program P and is defined as follows:
[P] = { (s, s’) | if P starts execution in state  hen it terminates in state s’ }.
4Definition 3: P is correct with respect to specification R if and only if [P]  R.
The relation refines is reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive, and thus
introduces a partial ordering on the set of specifications. Having this in mind we are
interested in answering the questions whether two given relations R and R’ on S have a
least upper bound called join, R R’, and a greatest lower bound called meet, R R’.
The following propositions answer these questions.
Proposition 1: Specifications R and R’ have a join if and only if:
LRRLRRL )'(' Ç=Ç
If this condition (the consistency condition) is satisfied, then:
R R’ )'()'( RRRLR ÇÈÇ=
Proposition 2: Any two specifications R and R’ have a greatest lower bound,
given by the formula:
R R’ )'(' RRLRRL ÈÇÇ=
By using this theory we can address the issue of validation of a specification.
As the authors argue in [10]:
“When one writes a specification from a user requirement, one can never be sure to have
captured all the requirements that the user has in mind (completeness); nor that he has not
captured something that the user did not have in mind (minimality). On the other hand,
because the user requirements are expressed in an informal document (typically using prose),
one cannot check formally for completeness or minimality against the formal specification.”
The proposed method of checking the completeness of a specification consists of
the following two phases.
5Phase 1: Generating Properties. The verification and validation group, whose
task is to generate properties for the purpose of completeness, asks questions of the form:
“What aspects of the user requirements could the specifier have missed?”
This task of generating relations that capture some selected properties from
informal sources is essentially the same as generating the whole specification. The main
difference is that the specifiers group has the obligation to capture all of the user
requirements (produce complete specification), whereas the verification and validation
group has the obligation of being “the devil’s advocate” – capturing properties that they
suspect the specifiers may have overlooked.
Phase 2: Matching the Specification against the Properties. Given a
specification R and a property V, the question that the verification and validation group
addresses now is:
“Does the specification R contain all the input output information of V?”
Definition 3: A specification R is said to be complete with respect to property V if
and only if R  V.
The proposed method of checking the minimality of a specification consists of the
following two phases.
Phase 1: Generating Properties. The verification and validation group, whose
task is to generate properties for the purpose of minimality, asks questions of the form:
“What the specifier could have recorded, that the user does not require?”
Phase 2: Matching the Specification against the Properties. Given a
specification R and a minimality property W, by its construction W carries information
that R is not supposed to carry.
Definition 4: A specification R is said to be minimal with respect to property W if
and only if R does not refine W.
62.2. Four-Variable Model and SCR
The Software Cost Reduction (SCR) method / specification language was
developed in the late 1970s at the Naval Research Laboratory for the purpose of
specifying the requirements of the Operational Flight Program of the U.S. Navy’s A-7
Aircraft. SCR is based on the four-variable method and its tabular representation
proposed by Parnas [4].
The four-variable model describes a system as a set of relations on four sets of
variables, and may be considered at two levels of abstraction. At the first and higher level
of abstraction, the system is considered as a whole in its environment. We can define two
sets of variables: monitored variables and controlled variables. Monitored variables are
those values in the environment that the user wants the system to measure, and the
controlled variables are those values in the environment that the user wants the system to
control.
At this higher level of abstraction, the relations that define the relationship
between the monitored variables and controlled variables are NAT and REQ. NAT
describes natural constraints imposed on the system by the physical laws and the
environment. REQ describes the desired behavior of the system, capturing the
relationship that the system must maintain between monitored and controlled variables.
Together, NAT and REQ define the desired system behavior within the environment.
When the system is decomposed into its input devices, software and output
devices, the other two sets of variables in Parnas’s four-variable model emerge. At this
lower level of abstraction, input devices are viewed as black boxes that convert the values
of the monitored variables into input data items that the software can understand. The
output devices are seen as black boxes that convert the software output data items into
values of the controlled variables.
The relation IN describes the desired behavior of the input devices and the
relation OUT describes the desired behavior of the output devices. The software’s job is
to transfer the output of the input devices, which are the input items, into appropriate
7output items, which will serve as input to the output devices. The mapping between the
input items and the output items is defined by the relation SOFT. The relations IN, SOFT,
and OUT are subsumed within NAT and REQ.
Based on this model, SCR uses several simple constructs including models and
mode classes, events and conditions. A mode class is like a finite-state machine. A finite
set of modes is defined for each mode class – representing the states in the machine. The
input alphabet is a set of events, the transition function is represented in a mode transition
table, and the initial state is the initial mode (which in SCR must be specified for each
mode class).
Events occur when any of the system’s input or output data items change value.
Using this we can specify that a mode of the system’s mode classes changes as a result of
a change in an input or output data item. Events also occur when modes change; that is,
when any mode class in the system changes from one mode to another, an event occurs
that can be used to trigger another mode transition elsewhere. This allows decomposing
the system specification in several finite state machines that communicate with each
other, instead of building a single complex description.
Using events and conditions each of the variable’s functional dependencies can be
described by using tabular notation.
 Further research on SCR by Heitmeyer [5] resulted in an automatic consistency
and completeness checking tool called SCR*. Although a specification is automatically
checked for consistency and completeness, this does not mean that the specification is
correct with respect to the requirements.
 One of the components of this tool is a simulator used for validation of the
specification. The user can enter some events that change the monitored variables and
observe whether the specified system behaves according to the expectations. The
simulator has a capability to use custom defined visual representation of the system, so
that the user can interact with the specified system in much of the same way as he/she
would interact with the real system. A customized simulator front end for an attack
aircraft specification has been described in [5].
8SCR* also uses another third party tool called SPIN for the purpose of
specification verification. SPIN takes as input a description of communicating finite-state
machines and then builds and explores the state space of the complex state machine
representing all of their interactions. SPIN verifies that certain completeness and
consistency properties, which may be input by the user, hold in every state of that
complex machine.
2.3. Visualization of Simulation Models
Simulation is extensively used for the purpose of validation of system models. By
having a completely accurate simulation of the system, we can avoid the difficulties that
exist in physical testing. For example: we cannot test one-shot systems like Arianne 5, or
high consequence systems like nuclear plants in hope to find some failure. Unfortunately,
the use of testing and simulation for the purpose of providing evidence that a system is
fault free is highly questionable. One of the reasons being that testing of a suitable
portion of the input space would simply take too much time, even if present day
accelerated testing techniques are used. Another problem is the difficulty to obtain a
completely accurate simulation of the real system model; often the simulation only
represents a simplification of the reality.
Many simulation researchers extensively explored the process of visualizing
simulation models [8], and today visualization has become a critical component of
simulation technology.  Some of the aspects where visualization is found to be very
beneficial in simulations (as identified in [9]) are the following:
· Verification and Validation – The logic model and the real-world behavior
can be verified by watching the model. Animation, combined with sound
statistical analysis, is an unmatched approach to evaluating how good a model
really is.
9· Understanding of Results – Often when the outcome from a model is not
understood, the animation can provide insight. By watching the area(s) of
interest, the modeler can “see” what is happening and understand how
dynamic behavior of the system affects the results.
· Communication of Results – Visualization is critical in communicating the
outcome of a simulation to the non-technical audience. Watching a few
minutes of visualization can eliminate hours of long tedious discussions.
We have borrowed these ideas and applied them in our research.
2.4. Using Virtual Environments for Certification
Cruz-Neira and Lutz explored the potentials of using virtual environments (VE)
for system certification [7]. A virtual environment can fit this purpose by building a
visual simulation of the system that is considered for certification.  Simulation trials are
required in order to validate and certify the system.
In order to use VEs to certify a system, one must first validate that the VE
accurately represents the real world that it is modeling. There are four key considerations
for measuring the quality of simulators that offer useful guidelines for VE model
analysis:
· Identify which environment variables the system must include and which it
can ignore.
· Confirm the accuracy of representation of environmental factors.
· Confirm the accuracy and resolution of the system’s calculations for each
environmental variable.
· Confirm the adequacy of the timing considerations.
10
Cruz-Neira and Lutz [7] conclude:
“Among the advantages of using VEs for certification are the possibility of more complete
testing and their dual use as design and certification tools. These factors will contribute to
increased use of VEs in the certification of safety-critical systems, especially in analysis of
system responses to failure conditions and in testing of hazardous physical conditions.”
Our research is following these ideas about using Virtual Environments for
validation.
11
CHAPTER 3: FORMAL MODELS
3.1. The Boundary between a Formal Model and User Perception
A specifier, based on the informal specification from the user (or the domain
expert1), writes the formal system specification. This formal specification is based on the
mental model (understanding of the system) that the specifier develops. It should be
complete, minimal and consistent with respect to the domain expert’s informal
specification. After the mental model has been developed it is mapped into a formal
domain, usually written in some form of formal notation or a domain specific language
(eg. SCR [4][5], Z [11], Relational Specifications [10], etc.)
There are two sources of errors that can arise during the formalization process.
The first source is the incomplete understanding of the informal specification (or the
domain) resulting in the development of an incorrect system model.  Second, the specifier
can introduce errors by incorrectly mapping the (possibly correct) mental model into the
formal domain.  Both of these types of errors can be discovered to some extent by
consistency and completeness checks and this procedure can be automated [4].  We note
that completeness and consistency are necessary but not sufficient conditions in assuring
that the developed model is correct.
The mathematical formulae that express the system can be very complicated, even
if the system itself is of moderate size.  System complexity increases the possibility that
errors are included in the formal specification.  The major difficulty lies in our ability to
correctly express system behavior in terms of symbolic formulae. Research has been
conducted on how to write and structure these formulae to support incremental
understanding [4][5].  Our research addresses the same issue, but attempts to solve the
problem in a graphical framework rather than in a mathematical framework.
                                                
1 In the rest of the thesis, we use the terms user and domain expert in erchangeably.  While this is
generally incorrect, in our case domain experts are the users of the VR modeling tool for requirements
validation.
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Another issue in the formalization phase is the domain expert’s understanding of
the formal specification.  Often the domain expert does not have the expertise in the
specific form of formal notation and cannot validate whether the formal specification
really captures all the desired features of the system correctly.  This is the validation
issue.  It can be handled by having two specification groups that develop the
specifications independently.  The first group is responsible for development of the
formal specification while the second group provides redundant information that can be
used to validate the specification developed by the first group [10]. The drawback of this
process is the fact that the domain expert is not involved in the validation, although
he/she is the one that possesses the most complete knowledge of the required system
behavior.
Formal Boundary
Specifier
Domain
Expert
Physical
Model
Visual Model
Symbolic Model
Figure 1: Boundary between formal specification and domain expert’s perception.
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The domain expert can be included in the process of validating formal
specification if the specification is rewritten in some easily understandable notation.
Candidate notations are natural languages or visual models, but the automated rewriting
is far from simple.
By using graphical representation of the formal system model, the domain expert
is included in the validation process. The specifier also benefits, because visual model
increases his/her ability to construct correct mental model and assists in the process of
mapping this mental model to formal notations. Figure 1 depicts our intention to use
visual model as a bridge over the typical boundary between the domain expert’s
knowledge and the formal model, which (supposedly) captures it.
3.2. Formal Model of the Specification
Our current research focuses on a subset of reactive systems classified as stab e.
Stable reactive systems have the following distinguishing properties:
1. Only the controller can initiate state transitions (e.g. the environment cannot initiate a
state transition);
2. The transitions between the states are deterministic;
3. The system can be suspended in any state without the need for continuous monitoring
and control (i.e. the reactive process can be suspended in any state).
A stable reactive system can be formally modeled as a vector of monitored and
controlled variables, as shown below:
· Let { }jj DmDmDmm ÎÎÎ= ,,, 2211 K  denote the observable states of the
system, where jiDi ££1, , is the domain of the monitored variable im .
· Let { }kk CcCcCcc ÎÎÎ= ,,, 2211 K  represent the vector of controlled
variables for the system, where kiCi ££1, , is the domain of the controlled
variable ic .
14
· Then { }kj cccmmms ,,,,,,, 2121 KK=  represents the state space of the system.
Note that the state space s of the system contains kj CCDD ´´´´´ KK 11
states.
· The transitions between the states are given by a set of equations in the form:
( ) ( )mFmP c¾®¾  where boolmP ®:  is a predicate on the observable state,
and mmF ®:  is a function on the observable state.
The transitions are specifying the functional capabilities of the system.  In the
high consequence realm, we are also interested in specifying the safety constraints of the
system. In order to define the safety constraints, we extend the domains Di of some of the
variables with two new values {error, hazard}.  Safety violation of type errordenotes
that some error has occurred in the system (e.g, collision).  On the other hand, safety
violation of type hazard represents that there is a possibility of error occurring, i.e., the
current state of the system is one or more transitions away from an error state.
We use the notation similar to transitions for specification of safety constraints:
· ( ) ( )mFmP ¾®¾ . boolmP ®:  represents a predicate on the observable state,
and mmF ®:  is a function on the observable state.  Predicate P r pres nts
the precondition of the safety constraint and function F modif es the state by
assigning {error, hazard} to the states that are in some type of safety
violation.
This work describes visual representations of systems that can be represented by
formal models introduced above.  One limitation is that these models do not address
timing issues. Timing is, generally, very important, since high consequence systems
usually have real-time performance constraints.  However, our current goal is visual
modeling as a methodology for model validation.  Therefore, we chose to start with
15
simple models. Timing issue will be addressed by extending the transition model with the
time parameter, which expresses the interval needed/allowed for a transition to complete.
3.3. Properties of the Model
The proposed method of modeling stable reactive systems is very similar to the
Parnas four-variable model on the higher level of abstraction. Also, it is consistent with
the theory of systems where every system has monitored variables (variables that can be
observed and measured) and control variables (variables that can guide and control the
system behavior).
We should notice that the monitored variables usually represent just portion of the
state in which the system is, because they represent set of variables that can be physically
measured. Sometimes we must relay on the system history in order to gain insight of the
real state of the system. This is done by introducing so called “virtual sensors” that are
monitoring the history of some variables and produce new virtual variable that is then
added to the monitored variables.
Reactive systems are systems that behave in certain environment. They receive
input from the environment, represented by the control variables, and react accordingly,
by changing the monitored variables. Almost all systems can be considered like reactive
systems. By adding the stable property, we restrict the set of reactive systems by
disallowing that they react and change the monitored variables without being supplied
with control vector. That is, whenever there is absence of control, the System State does
not change.  This means that there are no disturbances in the environment and that the
system itself is inherently stable. Usually, by careful engineering we can remove or make
sure that the disturbances in the environment do not affect the system. And also, we are
mainly interested in controlling stable systems.  So this model represents almost all
systems of practical interest.
One limitation of the way that we are modeling stable reactive systems was
mentioned in the previous section, and that was the absence of timing information for the
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transitions. Similar like in SCR, this problem can be avoided by adding information about
the time needed and allowed for a transition to finish.
This model has been used to specify variety of systems, one example being BART
(Bay Area Rapid Transport System) – automated train system in San Francisco. We are
using this model in order to specify a manufacturing robotic system, called “Production
Cell”.
3.4. Production Cell System
We used a robotic system called the Production Cell as a case study for formal
and visual modeling. This system has been widely used as a case study for the application
of formal methods [2].  Furthermore, for a system to be a suitable candidate for
visualization, it should have a strong and intuitively clear visual relationship between the
observable states ( jDD ´´K1 ) and physical reality.  Robotic systems often have this
property and are prime candidates for visual display.
Feedbelt
Deposit belt
Press
Table
Crane
Robot
Arm1
Arm2
Floor
Figure 2: Production Cell System
The production cell, shown in Figure 2, consists of two conveyor belts, an
elevating rotating table, a robot with two arms, a press, and a crane. The objective of the
production cell is to process metal plates. A plate is processed as follows. First it is
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placed on the first conveyor belt (called the fee  b lt), which then transfers it to the
elevating rotating table. The table then changes its position so that arm 1 of the robot can
pick up the plate by using an electro-magnet.  From there the plate is moved into the
press where it is processed.  Then, arm 2 of the robot removes the plate from the press
and places it on the second conveyor belt (called the deposit b lt) which transfers it to the
crane. The crane takes the plate and places it on the feed b lt and the cycle continues.
In addition of the desired behavior described above, the production cell can
encounter numerous failures.  For our purposes, some of the failures are considered to be
of high consequence.  These failures result in damaged system components, which may
be expensive to replace, and prevent plant’s continual operation.
The observable (stable) state of the production cell can be formally described by a
vector of 25 monitored variables, 2521 ,,, mmmm K= . Some of the system attributes
described by these variables are:
· The rotation and height of the elevating rotating table.
· The presence/absence of a plate on the rotating table.
· The presence of a plate on the left and right regions of a conveyor belt.
· The rotational position of the robot and the extension of both its arms.
· The state of the electro-magnet on the robot arms, as well as whether the arm
is holding a plate.
Each of these variables is quantified over a specific domain.  For example a
variable denoting presence/absence of plate on the rotating table is quantified over a
domain having two values (e.g., {true, false}).  The variable denoting the angle of
rotation of the elevating rotating table is quantified over the set of possible angles that the
sensor can distinguish.
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Figure 3: Total State Space of the Elevating Rotating Table
Modeling sensor data in its concrete form can result in variables being quantified
over very large sets, containing over hundreds or even thousands of elements. Example of
the total state space of the elevating rotating table is given in Figure 3. However, most of
these values are not interesting from the perspective of the specification.  It is possible to
formally group sets of elements/values into equivalence classes.  Intuitively, two
elements belong to the same equivalence class if and only if the same control vector can
be applied, in all cases, to both elements to achieve the desired overall system behavior.
Grouping elements in equivalence classes results in the corresponding monitored
variable being quantified over an abstracted domain. For example, the concrete sensor
data describing the angle of rotation of the elevating rotating table can be abstracted to a
domain having six values Figure 4. This abstracted domain defines the equivalence
classes that need to be distinguished by the controller to achieve the behavior described in
the specification.
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Figure 4: Abstracted State Space of the Elevating Rotating Table
For example the abstracted state space of the elevating rotating table is described
as a triple  <x1 , x2 , x3>, where x1 Î D1 and x2 Î D2 and x3 Î D3.
The corresponding abstract domains are:
· D1 = {1, 2, 3}, height
· D2 = {1, 2, …, 6}, angle of rotation
· D3 = {0, 1} È {error, hazard}, the presence/absence of plate or safety
violation
Given a model of the observable state space of this system, we need to define how
the assignment of values to controlled variables changes the system’s state.  In the most
fundamental form, one could explicitly enumerate all possible transitions from every
single observable state. However, such an approach typically leads to a very large
number of transitions. Even for modest systems, the observable state space can contain
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on the order of 1010  states, making an exhaustive enumeration approach infeasible. For
this reason the state transitions are written in more compact and general terms. This has
the unfortunate consequence of increasing their complexity, as well as the likelihood that
they contain some errors. Abstractly, the transitions are of the form: ( ) ( )mFmP ji vc ¾¾ ®¾ = ,
where P is a predicate on the observable state, ji vc =  denotes the assignment of the
value jv  to the control variable ic , and mmF ®:  is a function on the observable state.
In practice, the notation we use is slightly different.  We included the expression above to
highlight the three aspects of a transition: (1) a boolean expression on the vector of
monitored variables, (2) the assignment of a value to a control variable, and (3) a function
defining a change of the monitored variables. An example of a transition, defined for the
elevating table, is the following:
system(x_fb, table(x1, x2, x3), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x1 > 1
{ the table is higher than its bottom position }
®table_down®
system(x_fb, table(x1-1, x2, x3), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor).
Defining physical transitions in the system in terms of symbolic expressions is a
difficult step in the requirements engineering process.  This is due to the complexity that
is introduced by the interaction between system components.  For example, if arm 1 of
the robot has a particular range of extension, then rotating the robot can result in a
collision with the press, given that the press is in particular (wrong) position. From this
example, we see that from the perspective of safety, component interaction restricts the
state space of components and creates dependencies between the domains that monitored
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variables are quantified over. That is, the values that a monitored variable can assume is
constrained by properties of other monitored variables1.
As identified in [2] there are three more types of safety constraints in the
production cell system other than the component collisions, explained in the previous
example.
· Limitation of machine mobility: The robot, for instance, would destroy itself
if rotated too far; the press would damage itself if opened too far.
· Demand to keep metal blanks from being dropped outside safe regions: The
feed table has to make sure that the table is in the right position before
transporting the blank too far.
· Necessities to keep the metal blanks sufficiently separate: Light barriers, for
instance, can distinguish two consecutive blanks only if they have sufficient
distance.
The safety constraints are very important part of the formal specification of any
high consequence system, because they explicitly provide information about what should
not happen during the operation of the system, as well as the possible hazardous
situations.  In order to specify the safety constraints we use the notation similar to
transitions, ( ) ( )mFmP ¾®¾ .  The only difference is the omission of the assignment of
some value to a control variable. An example of a safety constraint on the elevating table
is the following:
system(x_fb, table(x1, x2, x3), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x2 = 1
{ the table has collided with the feed belt }
®
system(x_fb, table(x1, x2, error), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
                                                
1 For example, the monitored variable im  can only have value r  when the monitored variable
jm  has value that is less than s.
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CHAPTER 4: USING VR FOR VALIDATION
4.1. Building a Visual Model
Given a model of the state space of a system, cms o= , and a set of transitions
and safety constraints, we are interested in graphically displaying the following
fundamental aspects of the model:
· The observable state space jDD ´´K1 , or subsets of the observable state
space comprised of some of the defined domains, for example, { }mki DDD ,, .
where jmki ££ ,,1 .
· Subsets of the observable state space defined by predicates (e.g., ( )mP ). We
found it useful to display these subsets in the context of the portion of
observable state space (e.g., { }mki DDD ,, ) currently being viewed.
· Functions ( )mF , in terms of explicit sets of input output pairs.  We found that
viewing these types of functions (graphical representation of sets),
representing the totality of the input-output relation defined by the function, is
useful.
· Transitions  ( ) ( )mFmP c¾®¾ . A transition can be displayed by first showing
the subset defined by the ( )mP  and then using this set as the input domain for
F.
· Safety constraints ( ) ( )mFmP ¾®¾  can be visualized by displaying the output
of the function ( )mF  for the current system state, and using different colors to
represent different types of violations.
In addition to displaying the basic aspects of system models described above, we
developed a set of operators and a calculus for displaying the behavioral aspects of these
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models.  Animation operators that we found useful for understanding and validating
system models are [1]:
· Finite repetition of transition,
· Transitive closure of transition,
· Sequential composition of transitions,
· Parallel composition of transitions, and
· Parallel composition transition sequences.
Our present approach is to display the observable state space as a collection of
transparent geometric objects (mostly cubes) that stand in some geometric relationship to
one another (e.g., touching, overlapping, etc.).  Here, a geometric object represents a
portion of the observable state.  More precisely, geometric objects are defined by
coordinate vectors that map directly onto subvectors of m.  In general, Euclidean
relationships that objects need to satisfy are determined by the corresponding
relationships present in the physical system.  In this way, the objects in the model are
bound to the objects (and reflect attributes) of the physical system.
In the Production Cell case study, we developed a formal model that describes the
visualization of the state spaces of different components and the spatial relationships that
these components have between each other.  As a robotic system, most of the monitored
variables represent positions in the three dimensional (3D) space of different system
components.  The most natural way to visualize them is to build a 3D model that
represents the spatial information about different components and their interaction.  We
augmented the representation of the state space of the model in order to display animation
operators, which represent the other formal constructs, such as transitions and safety
constrains.
A prototype of this visualization system was developed at Sandia National Labs
using OpenGL and GLUT libraries. It runs in Unix/Windows environments. Screenshot
of this system is shown in Figure 5.  The next section describes our effort to improve this
system by porting it to a virtual reality environment.
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Figure 5: Visualization of the Production cell
4.2. Building a Virtual Reality Model
Viewing three-dimensional objects, representing the system state space, on a 2D
display results in difficult understanding of the spatial relationships among different
components. For this reason, we extended our visualization system to run on an
ImmersaDesk Virtual Reality System (see Figur  6).
 Virtual Reality (VR) can be defined as interactive computer graphics that
provides viewer-centered perspective, large field of view, and stereo [6]. ImmersaDesk is
a drafting table VR format display.  It features a 65 x 50 inch rear projected screen at a
45-degree angle.  Up to 5 users wear shutter glasses to view high-resolution stereoscopic
images.
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Figure 6: VR model of the Production cell
The prototype that was developed at Sandia National Labs was programmed in
OpenGL and GLUT libraries. One of the main concerns during the building the Virtual
Reality model of the Production Cell was to create a software that will run on both –
ImmersaDesk and PC with minimal changes. Having this in mind we have decided to
continue the development using OpenGL and GLUT libraries instead of programming
new prototype using legacy CAVE libraries or World Tool Kit that have full support for
the ImmersaDesk hardware. One drawback of this approach was the fact that GLUT
library currently does not have support for the wand controller and the tracking sensors,
but one of our future goals is to develop interface for the GLUT library to these devices.
The improved prototype has eight panels that represent the state spaces of
different components of the system. The states are represented as 3D cubes. By clicking
on some state we can change the status of that state. The change is displayed in the main
viewport that represents the whole system stereoscopically in 3D. Using the provided
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buttons we can change the status of different states, introduce new predicates in order to
be displayed, and fly around the system in order to focus on some important detail. The
current predicate that is displayed is presented in a text field in the bottom of the screen.
First step of the development was to extend the previous prototype with the ability
to specify and display safety constraints that we have introduced. This was done by
adding two new state variables to the representation of the states of the system,
representing error and hazardous conditions. The display of hazardous safety violation is
done by coloring the appropriate state of the system with red color, and similarly error
safety violation is represented by black color.
Then, we have added an evaluation function that monitors the state of the system
and displays the specified safety constraints. Whenever there is a change of the state of
the system, the evaluation function determines whether some of the predicates of the
safety constraints is satisfied, and displays the states that are specified in the safety
constraint.
In order to have appropriate demonstration of the capabilities of the system, we
have created an animation of the normal operation of the production cell. The life cycle
of a plate is being followed trough the system, and possible hazards are displayed. The
animations of separate component transitions were modified in order to take into account
the newly defined safety constraints.
The final work was to modify the application in order to obtain stereoscopic view
of the system. This was done by using the GLUT stereoscopic capability. Separate view
is calculated (rendered) for the left and the right eye of the viewer applying appropriate
transformations in order to obtain regular 3D view of the system. Then each of the views
is displayed, synchronized with the stereoscopic glasses in order to obtain 3D viewing
effect.
One of the advantages of using OpenGL and GLUT libraries is the fact that the
same software written for the ImmersaDesk runs on a PC with appropriate graphic card
that supports stereoscopic glasses, and if we don’t like 3D display we can use any graphic
card. On the other hand, for now, we are confined in using mouse and keyboard as input
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devices in the ImmersaDesk environment, which is not very appealing. We hope that in
the future this problem will be solved.
4.3. Discussion
For software requirements analysis, the use of VR environment definitely
increases the level of interaction between the system validator (domain expert, formal
methods expert, etc.) with the model.  The user is immersed in the system environment,
which allows him to move the viewpoint and to focus his/her attention on different parts
of the system.
As mentioned earlier, ImmersaDesk environment allows multiple users to interact
together. This is a very attractive feature in the validation process.  The domain experts
and members of the formal specification team can go through the system, step by step,
and discuss the features of the formal model in the VR environment.  The system model
would be validated the domain expert feels convinced that the VR model behaves
according to the expectations.   Ideally, the domain expert facing the VR model should
feel satisfied with all the observed system behaviors, and should be unable to differentiate
the virtual model from the final product, provided they have the same interface.   From
the behavioral point of view, the VR model and the final product must both behave the
same way.
We also need to make a distinction between the simulation of the system and the
proposed validation model. Each simulation represents one possible scenario in the
system history. When the number of the possible states in the system is large, validating
by simulation becomes infeasible, because the number of possible scenarios grows
dramatically. On the other hand the proposed VR validation method is concerned with
validating the formal model of the system, that is, validating the transitions with respect
to the safety constraints. If each of the transitions is validated to be correct then the
system model is validated. A superposition of multiple states can be specified in our
prototype system, and we can observe the effects of transitions on them simultaneously.
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Unlike following a single trajectory through the system state space which is done during
simulation. We believe that by using graphical representation, the process of validating
the transitions can be greatly enhanced and expedited in contrast with using symbolic
calculation. Most importantly, domain experts, formal methods experts and even the final
system users can be included in the validation process in a very efficient way.
4.4. Analysis of Specification Using Virtual Model
This section provides a simple example in demonstration of the proposed
methodology.   We describe specifying the conditions under which the robot arm1can
deposit the plate on the press. We are also interested in displaying the safety constraints
that exist under these conditions.  The complexity in the real problem from which this
example is derived, arises from the spatial dependencies that exist between the robot arms
and the press. For example, if the robot arm1 is not in the proper position, it can drop the
plate on the floor, thus violating the safety constraints. Furthermore, if the press is not in
the right position for accepting the plate from the robot arm1 a collision can occur.
We begin by formally defining the abstracted observable state space of the robot
and the press.
Robot = < x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7 >
Press=< x8, x9 > and
ii Dxii Î®££" 91:  where
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{ }
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positionpressD
violationsafetyorarmforplateofpresenceabsencehazarderrorD
onoffmagnetarmD
armofextensionD
violationsafetyorarmforplateofpresenceabsencehazarderrorD
onoffmagnetarmD
armofextensionD
rotationofangleD
/,,1,0
3,2,1
2/,,1,0
/21,0
27,,2,1
1/,,1,0
/11,0
18,,2,1
19,,2,1
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
==
==
==
==
==
==
==
==
==
K
K
K
29
Figure 7: The state space of the subsystem containing the press and robot arms.
When building a visual representation, formal description of the abstracted state
space is combined with the spatial knowledge about the system.  We are interested in the
spatial relationships among the states.  In this particular example, we are interested in the
spatial relationships between the states describing the press and arm1.
Given the appropriate spatial information, we next construct a graphical
representation corresponding to the formal description given above. The observable state
space of the system is represented in Figure 7.  Then we can proceed by projecting
predicates onto the graphical representation and their validation.
We display the following predicate from the original version of the formal model:
( ) 225,,,,,,,, 821987654321 =Ù>Ù<= xxxxxxxxxxxxP .
Figure 8: Two views of the specified predicate
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This predicate represents the portion of the space where the robot arm1can safely
deposit the plate to the press.  The plate is deposited safely only if the press is in the
proper position to accept the plate.  Graphical representation of this predicate is presented
in Figure 8.  The ability to animate the viewpoint and to fly around the objects provides a
great help in the comprehension of the spatial relationship between the objects.  From the
top view (Figure 8, right), we realized that some boundary states of the robot arm were
not fully contained in the state space of the press.  Dropping the plate in these states could
result in a safety violation.  So the correct predicate for the interaction between the arm1
and the press should be the following:
( ) 234,,,,,,,, 821987654321 =Ù>Ù<= xxxxxxxxxxxxP .
Figure 9: Corrected predicate
This new predicate is shown in Figure 9.  Viewing this predicate helps us
understand that it describes the intended portion of the state space.  After validation, this
predicate can be used as part of a precondition defining the following state transition:
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system(robot(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7), press(x8,x9))
: x1<4 Ù x2>3 Ù x3=1 Ù x4=1 Ù x8=2 Ù x9=0
®arm1_mag_off®
system(robot(x1,x2,0,0,x5,x6,x7), press(x8,1))
Figure 10: Hazardous states
We continue by displaying the safety constraints that exist in this state of the
system.
In Figure 10, we can the possible hazards (represented with transparent red
blocks) that can result in the states describing the interaction between the arm1 of the
robot and the press.  If the press moves up while the robot arm1 is in the position
described by the previous predicate a collision can occur.  Second, if the robot starts
rotating right there is a possibility of a collision between the press and the robot arm2.
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An example of these safety constraints is the following:
system(robot(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7),press(x8,x9))
: x1 < 5 Ù x2 > 2 Ù x8 = 2
®
system(robot(x1,x2, x3, x4,x5,x6,x7),press(x8+1,hazard))
If we had a predicate that contains a collision condition, then the resulting safety
violation is of type error.  In the visual model, errors are represented by black transparent
blocks.  An example follows:
system(robot(x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7),press(x8,x9))
: x1 < 5 Ù x2 > 2 Ù x8 = 3
®
system(robot(x1,x2, x3, error,x5,x6,error),press(x8,error))
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
Current requirements validation techniques do not address the problem of
demonstrating the correctness of the formalization phase satisfactorily.  This problem is
especially significant in the realm of high consequence systems.  Current techniques do
not provide friendly interfaces for domain experts, although they have the most complete
knowledge of the system being built.  We believe that validation techniques based on
reasoning about symbolic system representation do not take advantage of the human
cognitive process.  These problems can be addressed by having a suitable virtual
environment system model in which symbolic formulas can be projected, visualized and
validated.
A significant number of systems have physical characteristics that make them
suitable candidates for visual validation techniques based on the ideas described in this
paper.  We developed an initial theoretical and practical framework for displaying such
systems in virtual environments and described its use for validation purposes. We also
developed a prototype system to demonstrate and refine our ideas.  Although the
proposed method induces higher cost in the requirements formalization phase, the cost
can be justified in the development of high consequence systems.
Building the virtual model from the formal model can be expensive in terms of
the required time, and VR capable hardware.   The cost of VR capable hardware is a
minor concern, since cheaper portable CAVE-like environments powered by high
performance PCs are already available.  Upon experimenting with our model we are
convinced that the benefits gained, especially when high consequence systems are
concerned, outweigh the development expense too.
One way to decrease this cost would be to build a tool that can automatically
generate the virtual model of a given system, instead of creating them by hand like in the
current prototype.  In this case, the spatial constraints and relationships that exist among
system components would become a part of the formal specification. Our prototype
specification language for formal description of spatial relationships and constraints that
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a virtual model must satisfy is under development.  Spatial relationships and constraints
can be viewed in multiple visual representations describing systems and combinations of
subsystems.  Allowing multiple graphical representations is useful because they permit
alterations that enhance understandability while preserving the specified properties.
However, this approach complicates automatic generation of graphical interpretations.
One of our research goals is to address this problem in a suitable manner.
Another pending question is: How well are the systems in general suited for
visualization? As argued earlier, robotic system are very suitable candidates for virtual
environment modeling because their state space is in 3D space.  As such, it be easily
mapped into a virtual environment. But it is certainly a challenging problem to find
suitable visual models for some other types of systems.  A good visual model must be
intuitive and clear to both, the domain expert and the specifier.
It is our conclusion that using a virtual reality system, such as ImmersaDesk,
greatly enhances the ability of the specifier to grasp the system model and spatial
dependencies among different states.  The ability to view the system in 3D using different
viewpoints, and improved interaction between the domain expert and the model are the
main arguments in favor of our conclusion.  Furthermore, having the visual model allows
multiple interested parties to argue and validate the correctness of different transitions
and safety constrains.  This introduces a new quality in the formalization process.
Another area of future work is to explore efficient ways of interaction between the
users and virtual models, and the interaction between multiple users during system
validation.
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APPENDIX A: MODEL OF THE PRODUCTION CELL
by Dr. Victor Winter, Dejan Desovski
1. Model of the Production Cell
1.1. Feed Belt Model
regionsenso  2 =xregion leundetectab1 =x
Figure 11: Feed Belt State Space
· State Space = 21,xx
- where 2211 , DxDx ÎÎ
· Abstract Domains =
{ } { } violationsafetyorplateofpresenceabsencehazarderrorD /,1,01 =È=-
{ } { } violationsafetyorplateofpresenceabsencehazarderrorD /,1,02 =È=-
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1.2. Elevating Rotating Table Model
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Figure 12: State Space of the Table
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Figure 13: Abstracted State Space of the Table
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1.3. Robot Model
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Figure 14: State Space of Robot Arm1
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Figure 16: Extension Space of Arm1
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Figure 17: Extension Space of Arm2
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1.4. Press Model
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1.5. Deposit Belt Model
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1.6. Crane Model
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Figure 21: Abstracted State Space of the Crane
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1.7. Floor Model
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2. Summary
Production Cell State Space =
25242322212019181716151413121110987654321 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Suitably structured Production Cell State Space =
< production_cell(
feedbelt(plate_in_start_region(x1), plate_in_sensor_region(x2) ),
table(height(x3), angle(x4), plate(x5) ),
robot(rotation(x6), arm_1(extension(x7), mag(x8), plate(x9)), arm_2(extension(x10), mag(x11), plate(x12)) ),
press(position(x13), plate(x14) ),
deposit_belt(plate_in_start_region(x15), plate_in_sensor_region(x16) ),
crane(vertical(x17), horizontal(x18), mag(x19), plate(x20)),
floor(x21, x22, x23, x24, x25)
) >
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APPENDIX B: A FORMAL SPECIFICATION OF THE PRODUCTION CELL
by Dr. Victor Winter
1. Overview
The purpose of this document is to formally describe/specify the production cell in symbolic and
graphical terms. This specification consists of three components: (1) a description of individual domains,
(2) a description of how domains are configured (i.e., the layout), and (3) a description of transitions.
The production cell can be modeled in terms of aggregates overlapping or non-overlapping cube-
like objects (e.g., a 2-dimensional grid of “cubes”, an overlapping “fan” of cubes, etc.)
2. General Constructs
Below are the general constructs of the specification language. They are not completely
formalized, but the semantics should be clear (hopefully).
2.1. Foundational Types
We are interested in graphically and symbolically constructing models that contain values of
various types. At present we are interested in the following types:
· Symbolic Types
- boolean = {true, false}
- boolean^ = boolean È {error}
- string = {all strings}
- string^ = string È {error} where “error” is somehow distinguishable from other strings
- integer = {¼, -1, 0, 1, ¼}
- integer^ = integer È {error}
· Visual Types
- color = {all colors}
- symbol = {all symbols}
2.2. Graphical Types, Identifiers, Constants, and Variables
2.2.1. Primitive Graphical Types
In this formalism, the primitive types are cube-like objects. I say “cube-like” because they need
not be square – they can be bent and stretched as needed. Now these cubes contain visual information, and
the type of information that is contained in the cube determines the type of the cube. What we are
ultimately after is a formal connection between symbol-based objects and visual objects. The type of a cube
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(i.e., its signature) is defined as the following tuple: S ´ V, where S is a symbolic type and V is a visual
type.
For example:
type plate = boolean^ ´  color
type state_cube = string^ ´  color
type floor_cube = integer^ ´  (symbol or color)
In the above example, a plate is defined as a “cube” whose contents will be of type extended
boolean (i.e., boolean^) d whose values will be displayed by “color”. Similarly, the floor is a cube whose
contents will be of type extended integer and whose values will be displayed by “symbol”.
2.2.2. Identifiers of Graphical Types
After an (aggregate) graphical type has been defined, we can now declare identifiers of that type.
Type identifiers are defined similarly to variables but are nevertheless distinctly different. Type identifiers
denote type classes and not elements of a type (which is what is denoted by a variable). Below are some
examples of type identifiers:
type id metal_plate: plate;
type id table_state_cube, robot_arm1_state_cube: state_cube;
type id cell_floor_cube: floor_cube;
2.2.3. (Display) Instances of a Graphical Type
A type identifier can be instantiated by defining the mapping between its symbol-based and
visual-based values. An instance of a graphical type is an enumeration or simple algorithm that binds
(maps) symbolic values to display values. This is done by describing a set of tuples whose first element is a
specific symbolic element and whose second element is a specific visual element. The resulting value must
then be assigned to a variable of the appropriate type. For example:
display metal_plate = [ (true = 1, yellow), (false = 0, clear), (error, red) ];
display table_state_cube = [ (present, green), (absent, clear), (error, red) ];
display robot_arm1_state_cube = [ (present, green), (absent, clear), (error, red) ];
display cell_floor_cube = [ (0, clear), (i, display(i)) ];
The first statement assigns a cube instance that displays the value true as yellow-fill of the cube,
the value false as a clear-fill of the cube, and the error value as a red-fill of the cube. The cell_floor
assignment defines a cube that displays the value 0 as a clear-fill, and displays all other integer values in
symbolic form. The binding algorithm is a follows: a symbolic value x is matched with the first element of
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the tuple (i.e., 0) if x = 0 then the match succeeds and “clear” is displayed, if not x is matched with i (which
will always unify) – the result of the unification (i.e., i is bound to x) will then be displayed.
2.3. Aggregate Concrete Graphical Types
At this point we assume that we have defined a suitable collection of types, type identifiers, and
have instantiated the type identifiers with suitable display definitions. We are now ready to group these
instantiated type identifiers into general aggregate structures (which we also call component types).
Aggregates are 1D, 2D, or 3D cube structures. At present there are three basic types of structures
(cube composition operators) we have discovered:
· fan – objects are overlapping
· array – objects are touching but not overlapping
We handle aggregations of non-uniform types (e.g., records, structures) as follows:
array[1..n] of (t1 * t2 * ¼ * tn)
is an array in which the first element is of type t1 the second is of type t2 and the n
th is of type tn.  The fan
and array combinators can be used recursively to create complex structures. At present we are limiting this
to three dimensions.
The main issue that arises when describing structures is how objects (cubes, composite structures)
relate graphically to other objects. We will restrict ourselves to a three dimensional world with the x, y, z
axes being constant (directionwise) across all objects. To address orientation issues, we
extend/parameterize the fan and array combinations as follows:
· fan(i,j) = a fan that is in the i j plane where i and j are either x, y, or z.
· array(i) = an array that is in the i-axis where i is either x, y, or z.
We can now define component types as follows:
component type conveyor_belt = array(x)[1..2] of metal_plate;
component type table_cube = array(y)[1..2] of (table_state_cube * metal_plate);
component type table_level = fan(x,z)[1..6] of table_cube;
component type table_state_space = array(z)[1..3] of table_level;
component type arm1_cube = array(y)[1..2] of (metal_plate * robot_arm1_state_cube);
component type arm1_extension_space = array(x)[1..8] of arm1_cube;
component type arm1_state_space = array(z)[1..18] of arm1_extension_space;
Note: there is a slight problem here when arrays are bent … namely they don’t conform to the
dimension that they have been originally defined with respect to.
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2.4. Components
After we define suitable component types we can declare variables of those types as follows:
var feed_belt: conveyor_belt;
var table: table_state_space;
var arm1: arm1_state_space;
Elements of the rotating_table (defined above) can be accessed, in the traditional manner, as
follows:
table[1] = level 1 of the table_level
table[1][2] = the second cube of the first level of the table
table[1][2][1] = the table state of the second cube of the first level of the table
2.5. Configuration Constraints
The goal here is to describe how components relate to one another spatially. There are two basic
spatial relations that we are interested in expressing (1) touching, and (2) intersecting. The touching and
intersecting relations will be denoted respectively by the symbols || and Ç. They will be properly
subscribed with dimension information when needed. This will enable them to be defined for 1D, 2D, and
3D components.
2.5.1. Notation
Often it will be the case that all we can say about two components is that some subset of the first
component intersects (or touches) some subset of the second component. In particular, we may not be able
(or want) to say anything at a finer grain of resolution (e.g., element 1 intersects only with element 2, etc.).
We need a concise notation to express these ideas. Let X b  an aggregate object and let the expression
X[i1,¼,in] be an abbreviation for X[i1][i2]¼[in]. Then the expression
X[i1, ¼, in] : {p(i1, ¼, in) }
denotes a subset of X when p is a predicate.
For example:
table[y][x] : { y = 3 Ù (1 £ x £ 6) }
denotes the set of all table_cubes (1 through 6) that are on the top level (level = 3) of the table state space.
Similarly,
arm1[r][x] : { r > 8 Ù x > 1 }
denotes the set of all arm1 cubes that can potentially intersect with the top level of the table (defined
previously).
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Given the previously defined spaces, the intersection between the table and arm1 can be defined
by the expression:
table[y][x] : { y ³ 2 Ù (1 £ x £ 6) } Ç arm1[r][x] : { r > 8 Ù x ¹ 1 }
Note that there is discrepancy in the informal spec. In section A.6.1. (pg. 392) [2] talks about a
collision possibility when then table is in the top, but then goes on and constrains the table to be in the
bottom position (in particular NOT in the middle position) in order to avoid a collision.
2.6. Transitions
Transitions are defined as guarded commands on vectors of monitored variables (i.e., the
observable state space). The guard is a predicate on the monitored variables, the subscript of the “arrow” is
the control variable value that is set, and the expression of the right-hand side of the guard is a function on
the monitored variables.
( ) ( )mfmp ic 1¾®¾   where booleanmp ®:  and mmf ®:1
3. The Production Cell
In this section we formally describe the entire production cell.
3.1. Primitive Graphical Types for the Production Cell
type plate = boolean^ ´  color
type simple_state_cube = string^ ´  color
type complex_state_cube = string^ ´  color
type floor_cube = integer ´ (symbol or color)
3.2. Identifiers of Graphical Types for the Production Cell
type id metal_plate: plate;
type id table_state_cube, press_state: simple_state_cube;
type id robot_arm_state_cubes, crane_state_cube: complex_state_cube;
type id cell_floor_cube: floor_cube;
3.3. Display Instances of a Graphical Type for the Production Cell
display metal_plate = [ (true = 1, yellow), (false = 0, clear), (error, red) ];
display table_state_cube = [ (present, green), (absent, clear), (error, red) ];
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display robot_arm_state_cube = [ ((present, off = 0), green), ((present, on = 1), blue), (absent,
clear), (error, red) ];
display press_state_cube = [ (present, green), (absent, clear), (error, red) ];
display crane_state_cube = [ ((present, off = 0), green), ((present, on = 1), blue), (absent, clear),
(error, red) ];
display cell_floor_cube = [ (0, clear), (i, display(i)) ];
3.4. Aggregate Concrete Graphical Types for the Production Cell
3.4.1. Feed and Deposit Belts
component type conveyor_belt = array(x)[1..2] of metal_plate;
3.4.2. Elevating Rotating Table
component type table_cube = array(y)[1..2] of (table_state_cube * metal_plate);
component type table_level = fan(x,z)[1..6] of table_cube;
component type table_state_space = array(z)[1..3] of table_level;
3.4.3. Robot Arm1 and Arm2
component type arm_cube = array(y)[1..2] of (metal_plate * robot_arm_state_cube);
component type arm1_extension_space = array(x)[1..8] of arm_cube;
component type arm1_state_space = array(z)[1..19] of arm1_extension_space;
component type arm2_extension_space = array(x)[1..7] of arm_cube;
component type arm2_state_space = array(z)[1..19] of arm2_extension_space;
3.4.4. Press
component type ress_cube = array(y)[1..2] of (press_state_cube * metal_plate)
component type ress_state_space = array(y)[1..3] of press_cube;
3.4.5. Crane
component type crane_cube = array(y)[1..2] of (metal_plate * crane_state_cube);
component type crane_level = array(z)[1..7] of crane_cube;
component type crane_state_space = array(y)[1..3] of crane_level;
3.4.6. Floor
component type c ll_floor = array(z)[1..5] of floor_region;
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3.5. Components
var feed_belt, deposit_belt: conveyor_belt;
var table: table_state_space;
var arm1: arm1_state_space;
var arm2: arm2_state_space;
var press: press_state_space;
var crane: crane_state_space;
var floor: cell_floor;
3.6. Configuration Constraints
Technically there is a grid that consists of the cross product of all components. However in this
document we only include the components in the grid that have actual constraints.
3.6.1. Feed Belt and Table
feed_belt[x] : {x = 2} ||x table[y][x] : {y = 1 Ù x = 2}. Here ||x denotes “touching along the x-axis”.
feed_belt[x] : {x = 2} Ç table[y][x] : {x < 2}
3.6.2. Table and Arm1
table[y][x][k] : {y ³ 2 Ù (1 £ x £ 6) Ù k = 2} Ç arm1[r][x][k] : {r > 8 Ù x ¹ 1 Ù k = 1}. Note that
this intersection is only at the level of the metal_plate subcomponents.
3.6.3. Arm1 and Press
arm1[r][x] : {r < 5 Ù x > 2} Ç press[y] : {y = 3}
3.6.4. Press and Arm2
arm2[r][x] : { (10 < r < 15) Ù x > 1} Ç press[y] : {y = 2}
3.6.5. Arm2 and Deposit Belt
arm2[r][x][k] : {3 < r < 7 Ù x = 3} Ç deposit_belt[x] : {x = 1}
3.6.6. Deposit Belt and Crane
crane[y][z] : {y < 5 Ù z > 1} Ç deposit_belt[x] : {x = 2}. Note that the constraint  y < 5 Ù z > 1 is
different from what is given in the text. What is given in the text is an oversimplification and does not
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faithfully represent reality. The constraint y < 5 Ù z > 1 is an attempt to describe reality (though a domain
expert would need to be consulted to validate this). However, this should not present a problem, because
the transitions can still reflect the text.
crane[y][z] : {y = 5 Ù z = 3} ||y deposit_belt[x] : {x = 2}
3.6.7. Crane and Feed Belt
crane[y][z] : {y < 3 Ù z < 3} Ç feed_belt[x] : {x = 1}. Note that the constraint y < 3 Ù z < 3 is
different from what is given in the text. What is given in the text is an oversimplification and does not
faithfully represent reality. The constraint y < 3 Ù z < 3 is an attempt to describe reality (though a domain
expert would need to be consulted to validated this). However, this should not present a problem, because
the transitions can still reflect the text.
crane[y][z] : {y = 3 Ù z = 1} ||y deposit_belt[x] : {x = 1}
3.7. Transitions
The transitions below are defined with respect to the observable state space of the production cell.
The observable state space consists of a vector of 25 real and virtual monitored variables. The variables in
the vector have the following semantics (mappings) with respect to the model we have described so far:
3.7.1. Feed Belt
x1 = {0, 1} º feed_belt[1] = x1
x2 = {0, 1} º feed_belt[2] = x2
3.7.2. Table
x3 = {1, 2, 3}
x4 = {1, 2, ¼, 6}
x5 = {0, 1} º (table[x3][x4][1] = present) Ù (table[x3][x4][2] = x5) Ù
(y3 ¹ x3 Ú y4 ¹ x4) ® (table[y3][y4][1] = absent Ù able[y3][y4][3] = 0)
3.7.3. Robot
x6 = {1, 2, …, 19}
x7 = {1, 2, …, 8}
x8 = {0, 1}
x9 = {0, 1}
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x10 = {1, 2, …, 8}
x11 = {0, 1}
x12 = {0, 1} º (arm1[x6][x7][1] = (present, x8)) Ù (arm1[x6][x7][2] = x9) Ù
(y6 ¹ x6 Ú y7 ¹ x7) ® (arm1[y6][y7][1] = absent Ù arm1[y6][y7][2] = 0) Ù
(arm2[x6][x10][1] = (present, x11)) Ù
(arm2[x6][x10][2] = x12) Ù
(y6 ¹ x6 Ú y10 ¹ x10) ® (arm2[y6][y10][1] = absent Ù arm2[y6][y10][2] = 0)
3.7.4. Press
x13 = {1, 2, 3}
x14 = {0, 1} º (press[x13][1] = present) Ù (present[x13][2] = x14) Ù
(y13 ¹ x13) ® (press[y13][1] = absent Ù press[y13][2] = 0)
3.7.5. Deposit Belt
x15 = {0, 1} º deposit_belt[1] = x15
x16 = {0, 1} º deposit_belt[2] = x16
3.7.6. Crane
x17 = {1,2, …, 7}
x18 = {1, 2, 3}
x19 = {0, 1}
x20 = {0, 1} º (crane[x17][x18][2] = (present, x19)) Ù (crane[x17][x18][1] = x20) Ù
(y17 ¹ x17 Ú y18 ¹ x18) ® (crane[y17][y18][2] = absent Ù crane[y17][y18][1] = 0)
3.7.7. Floor
x21 = {0, 1, 2, …} º floor[1] = x21
x22 = {0, 1, 2, …} º floor[2] = x22
x23 = {0, 1, 2, …} º floor[3] = x23
x24 = {0, 1, 2, …} º floor[4] = x24
x25 = {0, 1, 2, …} º floor[5] = x25
3.8. System Abstraction
This vector describing the observable state can be structured for human readability as follows:
56
system(
fb(x1, x2),
table(x3, x4, x5),
robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12),
press(x13, x14),
db(x15, x16),
crane(x17, x18, x19, x20),
floor(x21, x22, x23, x24, x25)
)
3.8.1. The control variable: add_blank
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x1 = 0
{the initial region of the feed belt is empty}
®add_blank®
system(fb(1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x1 ¹ 0
{the initial region of the feed belt is empty}
®add_blank®
system(fb(error, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
3.8.2. The control variable: fb_on
Note that due to safety assumptions some interesting dependencies exist. For example, in the
semantics for the arm1_mag_on/off section, we assume that an error will occur when (1) the magnet of
arm1 is on and (2) a plate is on the table or on the press and (3) the table and arm1 are not in the plate
exchange position. In that same section, we do however permit the magnet to be turned on when there are
no plates on the table or on the press (i.e., anywhere near the magnet of arm1). Thus if feed belt moves a
plate onto the table AND the magnet of arm1 is already on, then an error will occur (according to our
extremely conservative model).
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x2 = 0
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{the second region of the feed belt is empty}
®fb_motor_on®
system(fb(0, x1), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x2 = 1 Ù x3 = 1 Ù x4 = 2 Ù x5 = 0 Ù x8 = 0
{the second region of the feed belt contains a plate and the table is in position and is not holding a
plate AND the magnet of arm1 is off!}
®fb_motor_on®
system(fb(0, x1), table(x3, x4, 1), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12)t, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, floor(x21,
x22, x23, x24, x25))
: x2 = 1 Ù x3 = 1 Ù x4 = 2 Ù x5 = 0 Ù x8 = 1
{the second region of the feed belt contains a plate and the table is in position and is not holding a
plate AND the magnet of arm1 is on!}
®fb_motor_on®
system(fb(0, x1), table(x3, x4, error), robot(x6, x7, x8, error, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane,
floor(x21 + 1, x22, x23, x24, x25))
system(fb(x1, x2), table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, floor(x21, x22, x23, x24, x25))
: x2 = 1 Ù Ø(x3 = 1 Ù x4 = 2)
{the second region of the feed belt contains a plate and the table is out of position}
®fb_motor_on®
system(fb(0, x1), table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, floor(x21 + 1, x22, x23, x24, x25))
system(fb(x1, x2), table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x2 = 1 Ù x3 = 1 Ù x4 = 2 Ù x5 = 1
{the second region of the feed belt contains a plate and the table is in position, but also contains a
plate}
®fb_motor_on®
system(fb(0, error), table(x3, x4, error), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
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3.8.3. The control variable: db_on
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), x_crane, x_floor)
: x16 = 0
{the second region of the deposit belt is empty}
®db_motor_on®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(0, x15), x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), x_crane, floor(x21, x22, x23, x24, x25))
: x16 = 1
{the second region of the deposit belt is not empty}
®db_motor_on®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(0, x15), x_crane, floor(x21, x22, x23, x24 + 1, x25))
3.8.4. The control variable: table_up/table_down
We assume that the magnet of arm1 should not be “on” while a plate is being moved into its
proximity.
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 < 3 Ù (x6 £ 8 Ú x7 = 1)
{arm1 is not in the vicinity of the table}
®table_up®
system(x_fb, table(x3 + 1, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 < 3 Ù x5 = 0 Ù Ø(x6 £ 8 Ú x7 = 1)
{arm1 is in the vicinity, but the table has no plate}
®table_up®
system(x_fb, table(x3 + 1, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 < 3 Ù x5 = 1 Ù Ø(x6 £ 8 Ú x7 = 1) Ù x8 = 0 Ù x9 = 0
{arm1 is in the vicinity, the table has plate and the magnet is off}
®table_up®
system(x_fb, table(x3 + 1, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
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system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 = 1 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x9 = 1 Ù Ø(x6 £ 8 Ú x7 = 1)
{arm1 is in the vicinity and both the table and arm1 have a plate }
®table_up®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, error), robot(x6, x7, x8, error, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 = 1 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x8 = 1 Ù x9 = 0 Ù Ø(x6 £ 8 Ú x7 = 1)
{arm1 is in the vicinity, has no plate but its magnet is on and the table has a plate}
®table_up®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, 0), robot(x6, x7, x8, error, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 = 3
{the table is in the top position and cannot be raised any more}
®table_up®
system(x_fb, table(error, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 > 1
{the table is higher than its bottom position}
®table_down®
system(x_fb, table(x3 - 1, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 = 1
{the table is in its bottom position and cannot be lowered any further}
®table_down®
system(x_fb, table(error, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
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3.8.5. The control variable: table_left/right
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x4 > 2
{the table is to the right of its leftmost safe rotational position}
®table_left®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4 - 1, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x4 = 2
{the table is in its leftmost safe rotational position}
®table_left®
system(x_fb, table(x3, error, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x4 < 5
{the table is to the left of its rightmost safe rotational position}
®table_right®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4 + 1, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x4 = 5
{the table is in its rightmost safe rotational position}
®table_right®
system(x_fb, table(x3, error, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
3.8.6. The control variable: arm1_forward/backward
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 £ 8 Ù x7 < 8
{arm1 is in a rotational position where moving it forward will not cause it to enter the state space
of the table AND is not fully extended}
®arm1_forward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7 + 1, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
61
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: Ø(x6 £ 8) Ù x7 < 8 Ù (x3 = 1 Ú x5 = 0 Ú (x5 = 1 Ù x8 = 0))
{arm1 is not fully extended AND is in a rotational position where moving it forward will cause it
to enter the state space of the table, AND (the table is out of the way OR the table isn’t holding a plate OR
the table is holding a plate but arm1 isn’t holding a plate and has its magnet off)}
®arm1_forward®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7 + 1, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: Ø(x6 £ 8) Ù x7 < 8 Ù (x3 ¹ 1 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x9 = 1)
{arm1 is not fully extended AND is in a rotational position where moving it forward will cause it
to enter the state space of the table AND the table is in an unsafe position and is holding a plate and arm1 is
also holding a plate}
®arm1_forward®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, error), robot(x6, x7, x8, error, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: Ø(x6 £ 8) Ù x7 < 8 Ù (x3 ¹ 1 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x8 = 1 Ù x9 = 0)
{arm1 is not fully extended AND is in a rotational position where moving it forward will cause it
to enter the state space of the table AND the table is in an unsafe position and is holding a plate and arm1 is
not holding a plate but its magnet is on}
®arm1_forward®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, 0), robot(x6, x7, x8, error, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x7 > 1
{arm1 is in a position where it can be retracted}
®arm1_backward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7 - 1, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x7 = 1
{arm1 is in a position where it cannot be retracted any further}
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®arm1_backward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, error, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
3.8.7. The control variable: arm1_mag_on/off
There are some serious gaps/omissions in the informal document regarding the failure space of the
magnet for arm1. For example, if arm1 is near, but not exactly in the proper position to pick up a plate what
happens? The answer really is dependent on the strength of the magnet and the definition of “near”. In
order to deal with this in a reasonable way from a safety perspective we will assume that, when plates are
present on the table or in the press, turning on the magnet in any position but the “table-arm1 plate
exchange position” will cause an error. Also, without more knowledge we cannot assume that the “table-
arm1 plate exchange position” is invertible. These assumptions are extremely restrictive, but without more
knowledge of the system we simply can’t assume anything else.
· The command to turn the magnet off partitions the state as follows:
- the magnet is already off – in which case the magnet off command does nothing
- the magnet is on and is holding a plate and the proper circumstances exists to transfer the
plate to the press – in this case the transfer occurs
- all other states a transition to an error state occurs
· Magnet on partitions the state space as follows:
- the magnet is already on – in which case the magnet on command does nothing
- the magnet can be turned on when it is in a position to pick up a plate from the table and the
table is in the proper position
- the magnet can be turned on when neither the table nor the press have a plate
- if the magnet is turned on at any other time an error will occur
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x9 = 0
{if arm1 is not holding a plate then turning the magnet off cannot cause any problems}
®arm1_mag_off®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, 0, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x9 = 1 Ù x6 = 3 Ù x7 = 6 Ù x13 = 2 Ù x14 = 0
{arm1 is holding a plate AND is in a position where it can safely deposit the plate on the press and
the press is in the proper position and is not holding a plate. Note that the informal document does not
specify what happens if there already is a plate on the press}
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®arm1_mag_off®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, 0, 0, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, 1), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane,
floor(x21, x22, x23, x24, x25))
: x9 = 1 Ù ((x6 ¹ 3 Ú x7 ¹ 6) Ú (x13 ¹ 2 Ú x14 ¹ 0))
{arm1 is holding a plate AND is not in a position where it can safely deposit the plate on the press
or the press is not in the proper position or is holding a plate. Also note that we are extremely generous in
describing the error that occurs (that is we assume all reasonably possible errors can occur)}
®arm1_mag_off®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, error), robot(x6, x7, 0, error, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, error), x_db,
x_crane, floor(x21, x22 + 1, x23, x24, x25))
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x8 = 1
{the magnet of arm1 is already on}
®arm1_mag_on®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x8 = 0 Ù x6 = 15 Ù x7 = 4 Ù x3 = 3 Ù x4 = 4 Ù x5 = 1
{the magnet of arm1 is off (i.e., this implies that arm1 is not holding a plate) AND arm1 is in a
position where it can obtain a plate from the table}
®arm1_mag_on®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, 0), robot(x6, x7, 1, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
: x8 = 0 Ù x5 = 0 Ù x14 = 0
{the magnet of arm1 is off AND there are no plates on the table or in the press}
®arm1_mag_on®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, 1, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
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system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane,
floor(x21, x22, x23, x24, x25))
: x8 = 0 Ù (x5 = 1 Ú x14 = 1) Ù Ø((x6 = 15 Ù x7 = 4) Ù (x3 = 3 Ù x4 = 4))
{the magnet of arm1 is off AND there are plates around (either on the table or on the press) AND
the table and arm1 are not in the plate exchange position}
®arm1_mag_on®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, error), robot(x6, x7, 1, error, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, error), x_db,
x_crane, floor(x21, x22 + 1, x23, x24, x25))
3.8.8. The control variable: arm2_forward/backward
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x10 < 7 Ù (x6 ³ 16 Ú x6 £ 11 Ú x13 ¹ 2)
{arm2 is not fully extended AND arm2 and the press are in position where moving arm2 forward
will not cause it to collide with the press}
®arm2_forward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10 + 1, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x10 < 7 Ù Ø(x6 ³ 16 Ú x6 £ 11 Ú x13 ¹ 2)
{arm2 is not fully extended AND arm2 and the press are in position where moving arm2 forward
will cause it to collide with the press}
®arm2_forward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, error, x11, x12), press(error, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x10 = 7
{arm2 is fully extended}
®arm2_forward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, error, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x10 > 1
{arm2 is not fully retracted}
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®arm2_backward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10 - 1, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x10 = 1
{arm2 is fully retracted}
®arm2_backward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, error, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
3.8.9. The control variable: arm2_mag_on/off
There are some serious gaps/omissions in the informal document regarding the failure space of the
magnet for arm2. For example, if arm2 is near, but not exactly in the proper position to pick up a plate what
happens? The answer really is dependent on the strength of the magnet and the definition of “near”. In
order to deal with this in a reasonable way from a safety perspective we will assume that, when a plate is
present in the press, turning on the magnet in any position but the “press-arm2 plate exchange position”
will cause an error. Also, without more knowledge we cannot assume that the “press-arm2 plate exchange”
position is invertible. These assumptions are extremely restrictive, but without more knowledge of the
system we simply can’t assume anything else.
· The command to turn the magnet off partitions the state space as follows:
- the magnet is already off – in which case the magnet off command does nothing
- the magnet is on and is holding a plate and the proper circumstances exists to transfer the
plate to the deposit belt – in this case the transfer occurs
- all other states a transition to an error state occurs
· Magnet on partitions the state space as follows:
- the magnet is already on – in which case the magnet on command does nothing
- the magnet can be turned on when it is in a position to pick up a plate from the press and the
press is in the proper position
- the magnet can be turned on in arbitrary positions only when the press does not have a plate
and the first region of the deposit belt does not have a plate
- if the magnet is turned on at any other time an error will occur
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x12 = 0
{If arm2 is not holding a plate then turning the magnet off cannot cause any problems}
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®arm2_mag_off®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, 0, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, db(x15, x16), x_crane, x_floor)
: x12 = 1 Ù (3 < x6 < 7 Ù x10 = 3) Ù x15 = 0
{arm2 is holding a plate AND is in a position where it can safely deposit the plate on the deposit
belt AND the first region of the deposit belt is not holding a plate}
®arm2_mag_off®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, 0, 0), x_press, db(1, x16), x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), db(x15, x16), x_crane,
floor(x21, x22, x23, x24, x25))
: x12 = 1 Ù Ø(3 < x6 < 7 Ù x10 = 3)
{arm2 is holding a plate AND is not in a position where it can safely deposit the plate on the
deposit belt }
®arm2_mag_off®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, 0, 0), press(x13, error), db(error, x16), x_crane,
floor(x21, x22, x23 + 1, x24, x25))
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x11 = 1
{the magnet of arm2 is on – so turning it on doesn’t change anything}
®arm2_mag_on®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: (x6 = 13 Ù x10 = 5 Ù x11 = 0) Ù (x13 = 1 Ù x14 = 1)
{arm2 is in a position to pick up a plate from the press AND the press is in position and is holding
a plate}
®arm2_mag_on®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, 1, x12), press(x13, 0), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), db(x15, x16), x_crane, x_floor)
: x11 = 0 Ù x14 = 0 Ù x15 = 0
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{the magnet is off AND there are no plates anywhere nearby (i.e., on the press or the first region
of the deposit belt}
®arm2_mag_on®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, 1, x12), press(x13, x14), db(x15, x16), x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), db(x15, x16), x_crane,
floor(x21, x22, x23, x24, x25))
: x11 = 0 Ù Ø(x6 = 13 Ù x10 = 5) Ù Ø(x14 = 0 Ù x15 = 0)
{the magnet is off AND arm2 s out of position for a plate pickup AND there are plates nearby
(i.e., on the press or the initial region of the deposit belt}
®arm2_mag_on®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, 1, error), press(x13, error), db(error, x16), x_crane,
floor(x21, x22, x23 + 1, x24, x25))
3.8.10. The control variable: robot_left/right
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 > 2 Ù (x6 > 5 Ú x7 £ 2 Ú x13 £ 2) Ù (x6 ¹ 16 Ú x10 = 1 Ú x13 ¹ 2)
{the robot is not in its leftmost position AND arm1 will not collide (after the rotation) with the
press AND arm2 will not collide with the press – Note that moving the robot left cannot cause arm1 to
“enter” the space of the table}
®robot_left®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6 - 1, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 = 5 Ù x7 > 2 Ù x13 = 3
{arm1 of the robot is just to the right of the press AND the arm1 and the press are in position so
that a collision will occur of the robot is rotated to the left}
®robot_left®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(error, error, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(error, x14), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 = 16 Ù x10 > 1 Ù x13 = 2
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{arm2 of the robot is just to the right of the press AND the arm2 and the press are in a position so
that a collision will occur if the robot is rotated to the left}
®robot_left®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(error, x7, x8, x9, error, x11, x12), press(error, x14), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 = 2
{the robot is in its leftmost safe position – Note that moving the robot left cannot cause arm1 to
“enter” the space of the table}
®robot_left®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(error, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
: x6 < 18 Ù (x6 ¹ 9 Ú x7 = 1 Ú x3 = 1 Ú x5 = 0 Ú x9 = 0) Ù (x6 ¹ 11 Ú x10 = 1 Ú x13 ¹ 2)
{the robot is not in its rightmost position AND arm1 will not collide with the table (i.e., the plate
space) AND arm2 will not collide with the press. Note that in a right rotation, all we are concerned about is
crossing a collision boundary when moving from left to right}
®robot_right®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6 + 1, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
: x6 < 18 Ù x6 = 9 Ù x7 ¹ 1 Ù x3 ¹ 1 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x9 = 1
{the robot is not in its rightmost position AND after rotation, arm1 will collide with the table (i.e.,
the plate space)}
®robot_right®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, error), robot(error, x7, x8, error, x10, x11, x12), press(error, x14), x_db,
x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 < 18 Ù x6 = 11 Ù x10 > 1 Ù x13 = 2
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{the robot is not in its rightmost position AND arm2 will collide with the press. Note that in a
right rotation, all we are concerned about is crossing a collision boundary when moving from left to right}
®robot_right®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(error, x7, x8, x9, error, x11, x12), press(error, x14), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 = 18
{the robot is in its rightmost position}
®robot_right®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(error, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
3.8.11. The control variable: crane_to_belt1/belt2
The horizontal movement of the crane is considerably restricted in the informal document.
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 £ 3 Ù x18 < 3
{the crane is in a position where it can move to the deposit belt}
®crane_to_belt2®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18 + 1, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x18 = 3
{the crane cannot be moved any further in the direction of the deposit belt}
®crane_to_belt2®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, error, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 > 3
{the crane is to low to be moved horizontally}
®crane_to_belt2®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(error, error, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
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: x17 £ 3 Ù x18 > 1
{the crane is in a position where it can move to the feed belt}
®crane_to_belt1®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18 - 1, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x18 = 1
{the crane cannot be moved any further in the direction of the feed belt}
®crane_to_belt1®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, error, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 > 3
{the crane is to low to be moved horizontally}
®crane_to_belt1®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(error, error, x19, x20), x_floor)
3.8.12. The control variable: crane_lift/lower
Given the restrictions on the horizontal movement of the crane it appears to be safest to only
permit vertical motion below x17 = 3 when the crane is directly above the deposit belts. It also appears that
there is another omission in the informal document – namely what happens if the crane moves to deposit a
plate on the feed belt but there already is a plate in the initial region of the feed belt (e.g., does a plate
collision occur)? The same omission exists for the crane and the deposit belt.
The horizontal movement of the crane is considerably restricted in the informal document.
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 1
{the crane is in its uppermost position (a plate clash cannot occur after lowering it)}
®crane_lower®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17 + 1, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 2 Ù (x1 = 0 Ú x20 = 0 Ú x18 ¹ 1)
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{the crane is above the (general) unsafe vertical boundary AND a plate collision with the feed belt
cannot occur}
®crane_lower®
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17 + 1, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 2 Ù Ø(x1 = 0 Ú x20 = 0 Ú x18 ¹ 1)
{the crane is above the (general) unsafe vertical boundary AND a plate collision with the feed belt
will occur}
®crane_lower®
system(fb(error, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(error, x18, x19, error), x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 3 Ù x18 ¹ 3
{the crane is at the (general) unsafe vertical boundary AND is not above the deposit belt}
®crane_lower®
system(fb(error, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(error, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 3 Ù x18 = 3
{the crane is one above its next-to bottom-most (i.e., to avoid the potential of a plate clash
between the crane and the deposit belt) safe position AND is above the deposit belt}
®crane_lower®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17 + 1, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 4 Ù (x16 = 0 Ú x20 = 0)
{the crane is in its next-to bottom-most safe position AND a plate clash will not occur between the
crane and the deposit belt}
®crane_lower®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17 + 1, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 4 Ù Ø(x16 = 0 Ú x20 = 0)
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{the crane is in its next-to bottom-most safe position AND a plate clash will occur between the
crane and the deposit belt}
®crane_lower®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, error), crane(error, x18, x19, error), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 5
{the crane is in its bottom-most position (this can only happen when the crane is above the deposit
belt)}
®crane_lower®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, error), crane(error, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 > 1
{the crane is not in its upper-most position}
®crane_lift®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17 - 1, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 1
{the crane is in its upper-most position}
®crane_lift®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(error, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
3.8.13. The control variable: crane_mag_on/off
The problem with the magnet on the crane is similar to the problem with the magnets for arm1 and
arm2 of the robot. Namely, we want to restrict when the magnet can be turned on – specifically the magnet
of the crane should only be turned on when (1) conditions exist that enable the crane to pick up a plate from
the deposit belt, OR (2) there are no plates in the vicinity (in the initial region of the feed belt or in the final
region of the deposit belt). Again, we assume that the “picking up” (from the deposit belt) and “depositing”
(on the feed belt) operations are not invertible (e.g., the crane cannot safely deposit a plate on the deposit
belt).
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
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: x19 = 1
{the crane magnet is already on}
®crane_mag_on®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, 1, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x19 = 0 Ù (x17 = 5 Ù x18 = 3) Ù x16 = 1
{the crane magnet is off AND the crane is above the deposit belt AND the final region of the
deposit belt contains a plate}
®crane_mag_on®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, 0), crane(x17, x18, 1, 1), x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x19 = 0 Ù Ø(x17 = 5 Ù x18 = 3) Ù (x1 = 1 Ú x16 = 1)
{the crane magnet is off AND the crane is not in a position to pick up a plate from the deposit belt
AND there is a plate in the “vicinity”}
®crane_mag_on®
system(fb(error, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, error), crane(x17, x18, 1, error), x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x19 = 0 Ù (x1 = 0 Ù x16 = 0)
{the crane magnet is off AND there are no plates in the “vicinity”}
®crane_mag_on®
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, 1, x20), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x20 = 0
{the crane is not holding a plate}
®crane_mag_off®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, 0, x20), x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x19 = 1 Ù x20 = 1 Ù (x17 = 3 Ù x18 = 1 Ù x1 = 0)
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{the crane magnet is on AND the crane is holding a plate AND the crane is in a position to deposit
a plate on the feed belt and the feed belt is ready to receive a plate}
®crane_mag_off®
system(fb(1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, 0, 0), x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), floor(x21, x22, x23,
x24, x25))
: x19 = 1 Ù x20 = 1 Ù Ø(x17 = 3 Ù x18 = 1 Ù x1 = 0)
{the crane magnet is on AND the crane is holding a plate AND the crane is out of position to
deposit a plate on the feed belt or the feed belt is not ready to receive a plate. Note that this error could be
modeled a little more precisely (e.g., the crane drops a plate on the floor, the crane drops a plate on another
plate, etc.)}
®crane_mag_off®
system(fb(error, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, error), crane(x17, x18, 0, error), floor(x21,
x22, x23, x24, x25 + 1))
3.8.14. The control variable: press_upward/downward
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 < 5 Ù x7 > 2 Ù x13 = 2
{the robot is in a rotational space where arm1 can collide with the press AND the extension of
arm1 is such that a collision is possible AND the press is in the middle position – moving it up will cause a
collision – here we also assume that it is not the case that both arm1 and the press are holding a plate
because otherwise an error state would have resulted}
®press_upward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(error, error, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(error, x14), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 < 5 Ù x7 > 2 Ù x13 = 1 Ù (x9 = 0 Ú x14 = 0)
{the robot is in a rotational space where arm1 can collide with the press AND the extension of
arm1 is such that a collision is possible AND the press is in the bottom position AND arm1 and the press
are not both holding a plate (note that this is not stated in the informal specification)}
®press_upward®
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system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13 + 1, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: Ø(x6 < 5 Ù x7 > 2) Ù x13 = 2
{the robot is in a space where arm1 cannot collide with the press AND the press is in the middle
position}
®press_upward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13 + 1, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 > 10 Ù x6 < 15 Ù x10 > 1 Ù x13 = 1
{arm2 is in position where it can collide with the press}
®press_upward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, error), press(x13, error), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: Ø(x6 > 10 Ù x6 < 15 Ù x10 > 1) Ù x13 = 1
{arm2 is not in position where it can collide with the press}
®press_upward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14 + 1), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x13 = 3
{the press is in uppermost position}
®press_upward®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, press(error, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: Ø(x6 > 10 Ù x6 < 15 Ù x10 > 1) Ù x13 = 3
{the press is in uppermost position and cannot collide with robot arm2}
®press_downward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13 - 1, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
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: x6 > 10 Ù x6 < 15 Ù x10 > 1 Ù x13 = 3
{the press is in uppermost position and can collide with robot arm2}
®press_downward®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, error), press(error, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x13 = 2
{the press is in middle position}
®press_downward®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, press(x13 - 1, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x13 = 1
{the press is in bottom position}
®press_downward®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, press(error, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
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APPENDIX C: SAFETY CONSTRAINTS IN THE PRODUCTION CELL
by Dejan Desovski
1. Overwiew
The purpose of this document is to formally extend the formal specification of the
Production Cell in order to define safety constraints and the way they are displayed in
addition to the functional specification described previously. This extension consists of
two parts: (1) an extension of the individual domains, and (2) description of safety
constraints.
2. Extension of the Individual Domains
We are interested in graphically and symbolically representing the safety
constraints in the Production Cell, in addition to the functional capabilities defined by the
formal specification. We take incremental approach in order to achieve this goal. Having
already defined the abstracted state space of the model, and the functional specification,
we will extend the individual domains in order to specify the safety constraints that we
are interested in, and then specify the actual safety constraints.
There are two types of safety violations that we like to display:
– error states, which represent a terminating safety violations (e.g., a collision
has already occurred, a plate has fallen to the floor);
– hazardous tates, representing states that are one or more transitions away
from a terminating safety violations.
2.1. Extension of the Symbolic Foundational Types
In order to represent these types of safety violations first we need to extend the
symbolic foundational types:
· Symbolic Types
- boolean = {true, false}
- boolean^ = boolean È {error, hazard}
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- string = {all strings}
- string^ = string È {error, hazard} where “error” and “hazard” are
somehow distinguishable from other strings
- integer = {¼, -1, 0, 1, ¼}
- integer^ = integer È {error, hazard}
2.2. Extension of the display instances of the graphical types
We extend the display instances of the graphical types for the Production Cell in
order to display the safety violations with different colors:
display metal_plate = [ (true = 1, yellow), (false = 0, clear), (hazard, red), (error,
black) ];
display table_state_cube = [ (present, green), (absent, clear), (hazard, red), (error,
black) ];
display robot_arm_state_cube = [ ((present, off = 0), green), ((present, on = 1),
blue), (absent, clear), (hazard, red), (error, black) ];
display press_state_cube = [ (present, green), (absent, clear), (hazard, red), (error,
black) ];
display crane_state_cube = [ ((present, off = 0), green), ((present, on = 1), blue),
(absent, clear), (hazard, red), (error, black) ];
display cell_floor_cube = [ (0, clear), (i, display(i)) ];
The rest of the formal specification stays the same. Now we are ready to define
the safety constraints.
3. Safety constraints
The safety constraints we are going to define represent the safety violations of the
current state in stable instance of time, or the possible safety violations that exist within
one or more transitions from the current stable state. This aggregate information provides
important information during the validation phase. For example it provides information
about the possible hazardous states during the operation of the system, and more careful
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planing and design of control algorithms can be applied in order these states to be
avoided. The safety constraints can be used as guarding conditions in the transitions,
restricting execution of transitions that are hazardous or produce errors.
We are defining the safety constraints similarly like the transitions, with only
difference being that we are not specifying an assignment to control variable (all the
possible assignments are considered): ( ) ( )mFmP ¾®¾ . boolmP ®:  represents a
predicate on the observable state, and mmF ®:  is a function on the observable state.
Predicate P represents the precondition of the safety constraint and function F modifies
the state by assigning {error, hazard} to the states that are in some type of safety
violation.
3.1. Feed Belt Safety Constraints
system(fb(x1, x2), table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x2 = 1 Ù Ø(x3 = 1 Ù x4 = 2)
{the second region of the feed belt contains a plate and the table is out of position }
®
system(fb(x1, hazard), table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x2 = 1 Ù x3 = 1 Ù x4 = 2 Ù x5 = 1
{the second region of the feed belt contains a plate and the table is in position, but also contains a
plate}
®
system(fb(x1, hazard), table(x3, x4, hazard), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x2 = 1 Ù x3 = 1 Ù x4 = 2 Ù x5 = 0 Ù x8 = 1
{the second region of the feed belt contains a plate and the table is in position and is not holding a
plate AND the magnet of arm1 is on!}
®
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system(fb(x1, hazard), table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
3.2. Deposit Belt Safety Constraints
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), x_crane, x_floor)
: x16 = 1
{the second region of the deposit belt is not empty}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, hazard), x_crane, x_floor)
3.3. Table Safety Constraints
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 = 1 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x9 = 1 Ù Ø(x6 £ 8 Ú x7 = 1)
{arm1 is in the vicinity and both the table and arm1 have a plate }
®
system(x_fb, table(x3 + 1, x4, hazard), robot(x6, x7, x8, hazard, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 = 2 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x9 = 1 Ù Ø(x6 £ 8 Ú x7 = 1)
{the plates of arm1 and table have colided}
®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, error), robot(x6, x7, x8, error, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 = 1 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x8 = 1 Ù x9 = 0 Ù Ø(x6 £ 8 Ú x7 = 1)
{arm1 is in the vicinity, has no plate but its magnet is on and the table has a plate}
®
system(x_fb, table(x3 + 1, x4, hazard), robot(x6, x7, x8, hazard, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
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system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 = 3
{the table is in the top position and cannot be raised any more}
®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, hazard), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x3 = 1
{the table is in its bottom position and cannot be lowered any further}
®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, hazard), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x4 = 2
{the table is in its leftmost safe rotational position}
®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, hazard), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x4 = 1
{the table has collided with the feed belt}
®
system(fb(x1, error), table(x3, x4, error), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x4 = 5
{the table is in its rightmost safe rotational position}
®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, hazard), x_robot, x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
3.4. Robot Safety constraints
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: Ø(x6 £ 8) Ù x7 < 8 Ù (x3 ¹ 1 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x9 = 1)
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{arm1 is not fully extended AND is in a rotational position where moving it forward will cause it
to enter the state space of the table AND the table is in an unsafe position and is holding a plate and arm1 is
also holding a plate}
®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, hazard), robot(x6, x7 + 1, x8, hazard, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: Ø(x6 £ 8) Ù x7 < 8 Ù (x3 ¹ 1 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x8 = 1 Ù x9 = 0)
{arm1 is not fully extended AND is in a rotational position where moving it forward will cause it
to enter the state space of the table AND the table is in an unsafe position and is holding a plate and arm1 is
not holding a plate but its magnet is on}
®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, hazard), robot(x6, x7 + 1, x8, hazard, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x7 = 1
{arm1 is in a position where it cannot be retracted any further}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, hazard, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x10 < 7 Ù Ø(x6 ³ 16 Ú x6 £ 11 Ú x13 ¹ 2)
{arm2 is not fully extended AND arm2 and the press are in position where moving arm2 forward
will cause it to collide with the press}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10 + 1, x11, hazard), press(x13, hazard), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x10 > 7 Ù Ø(x6 ³ 16 Ú x6 £ 11 Ú x13 ¹ 2)
{arm2 has collided with the press}
®
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system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, error), press(x13, error), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x10 = 1
{arm2 is fully retracted}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, hazard), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 = 5 Ù x7 > 2 Ù x13 = 3
{arm1 of the robot is just to the right of the press AND the arm1 and the press are in position so
that a collision will occur of the robot is rotated to the left}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6 - 1, x7, x8, hazard, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, hazard), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 = 16 Ù x10 > 1 Ù x13= 2
{arm2 of the robot is just to the right of the press AND the arm2 and the press are in a position so
that a collision will occur if the robot is rotated to the left}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6 - 1, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, hazard), press(x13, hazard), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 = 2
{the robot is in its leftmost safe position – Note that moving the robot left cannot cause arm1 to
“enter” the space of the table}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6 - 1, x7, x8, hazard, x10, x11, hazard), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 = 1
{the robot has rotated too far}
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®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, error, x10, x11, error), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, x5), robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
: x6 < 18 Ù x6 = 9 Ù x7 ¹ 1 Ù x3 ¹ 1 Ù x5 = 1 Ù x9 = 1
{the robot is not in its rightmost position AND after rotation, arm1 will collide with the table (i.e.,
the plate space)}
®
system(x_fb, table(x3, x4, hazard), robot(x6 + 1, x7, x8, hazard, x10, x11, x12), press(error, x14), x_db,
x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 < 18 Ù x6 = 11 Ù x10 > 1 Ù x13 = 2
{the robot is not in its rightmost position AND arm2 will collide with the press. Note that in a
right rotation, all we are concerned about is crossing a collision boundary when moving from left to right}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6 + 1, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, hazard), press(x13, hazard), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 = 18
{the robot is in its rightmost position}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, hazard, x10, x11, hazard), x_press, x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
3.5. Crane Safety Constraints
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x18 = 3
{the crane cannot be moved any further in the direction of the deposit belt}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, hazard), x_floor)
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system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 > 3
{the crane is to low to be moved horizontally}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, hazard), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x18 = 1
{the crane cannot be moved any further in the direction of the feed belt}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, hazard), x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 2 Ù Ø(x1 = 0 Ú x20 = 0 Ú x18 ¹ 1)
{the crane is above the (general) unsafe vertical boundary AND a plate collision with the feed belt
can occur}
®
system(fb(hazard, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, hazard), x_floor)
system(fb(x1, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 3 Ù x18 ¹ 3
{the crane is at the (general) unsafe vertical boundary AND is not above the deposit belt}
®
system(fb(hazard, x2), x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, hazard), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 4 Ù Ø(x16 = 0 Ú x20 = 0)
{the crane is in its next-to bottom-most safe position AND a plate clash can occur between the
crane and the deposit belt}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, hazard), crane(x17, x18, x19, hazard), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, x16), crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 5
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{the crane is in its bottom-most position (this can only happen when the crane is above the deposit
belt)}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, db(x15, hazard), crane(x17, x18, x19, hazard), x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, x20), x_floor)
: x17 = 1
{the crane is in its upper-most position}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, x_robot, x_press, x_db, crane(x17, x18, x19, hazard), x_floor)
3.6. Press Safety Constraints
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 < 5 Ù x7 > 2 Ù x9 = 1 Ù x13 = 3
{arm1 and press have collided}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, error, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, error), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x13 = 2  Ù x6 < 5 Ù x7 > 2
{press can collide with arm1}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, hazard, x10, x11, x12), press(x13 + 1, hazard), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x13 = 3  Ù x6 < 5 Ù x7 > 2 Ù x9 = 0
{states of arm1 which can collide with the press}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, hazard, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
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: x6 > 10 Ù x6 < 15 Ù x10 > 1 Ù x12 = 1 Ù x13 = 2
{arm2 and press have collided}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, error), press(x13, error), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 > 10 Ù x6 < 15 Ù x10 > 1 Ù x12 = 0 Ù x13 = 2
{states of arm2 which can collide with the press}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, hazard), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12), press(x13, x14), x_db, x_crane, x_floor)
: x6 > 10 Ù x6 < 15 Ù x10 > 1 Ù x13 = 3
{arm2 and press can colide}
®
system(x_fb, x_table, robot(x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, hazard), press(x13 - 1, x14), x_db, x_crane,
x_floor)
